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Abstract—A digital forensics investigation may involve 
procedures for both live forensics and for gathering evidence 
from a device in a forensics laboratory. Due to the focus on 
capturing volatile data during a live forensics investigation, tools 
have been developed that are aimed at capturing specific data 
surrounding state information. However, there may be 
circumstances whereby non-volatile data analysis, such as the 
identification of files of interest, is also required. In such an 
investigation, the ability to use file-wise, or hash, signatures is 
precluded due to pre-processing requirements by the forensics 
tools. Therefore, this paper presents SlackStick, a novel 
automated approach run from a USB memory device for the 
identification of files of interest or non-volatile evidence triage 
using an alternative signature scheme. Moreover, the approach 
may be used by inexpert users during a first-response phase of an 
investigation. The results of the case study presented in this 
paper demonstrate the applicability of the approach. 
Keywords—Digital forensics, file signatures, live investigations  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Society's reliance on technology has brought many 
economic and cultural benefits, but it also harbors many 
technical and social challenges. One major benefit is our access 
to data due to information sharing between multitudes of 
devices. However, these various technologies can lead to a 
greater access to the means by which illegal activities can be 
perpetrated. If illegal activities are suspected, a resulting digital 
forensics investigation may be required to provide evidence of 
any wrongdoing. 
A digital forensics investigation may involve procedures 
for both live forensics and for gathering evidence from a device 
in a forensics laboratory. Live forensics takes place at the 
location at which the computing device is seized prior to the 
computer being turned off and taken to the forensics 
laboratory. The aim of such an investigation is to capture 
volatile data pertinent to the case that may be lost once the 
computer is powered down, such as existing network 
connections, open ports, and running software. Persistent or 
non-volatile data written to the hard drive, such as user files, 
system logs, and operating system configurations, may be 
retrieved using forensics tools such as EnCase [1] and the 
Forensics Toolkit (FTK) [2] even when the computing device 
is powered down. In this way evidence may be retrieved by an 
examiner in the forensics laboratory at a later date. 
Due to the focus on capturing volatile data during a live 
forensics investigation, tools have been developed that are 
aimed at capturing specific data surrounding state information. 
However, there may be circumstances whereby non-volatile 
data analysis is also required at this stage. For example, 
probation services wishing to ensure an offender’s compliance 
with a court order regarding computer usage, or triaging a 
number of devices owned by a suspect to identify the location 
of files of interest to the examiner prior to analysis in the 
forensics laboratory. Forensics techniques for file analysis used 
in the laboratory cannot be applied in live forensics 
investigations due to the preparation of the evidence for 
analysis by the forensics software. For example, the widely 
used technique of using file hashes as a signature scheme to 
identify data of interest requires that the evidence is pre-
processed, a time consuming procedure that precludes this 
approach for  live forensics. However, such evidence may be 
pertinent to the examiner at this stage of the investigation and if 
collected here, may save time to reduce costs and provide focus 
during the overall investigatory process. 
This paper presents SlackStick, a novel approach for the 
identification of files of interest or non-volatile evidence triage 
during a live forensics investigation. As will be discussed in the 
next section, the common practice of using file hashes for file 
identification is not without its issues, often precluding this 
activity from such investigations. Therefore, rather than use file 
hashes, the approach posited in this paper uses an alternative 
method based on identifying features of the underlying file 
rather than performing an operation on the whole file or data 
blocks to create the search signature. The automated SlackStick 
software runs from an external device, such as flash memory, 
that is able to access persistent data stores in read-only mode so 
as not to tamper with evidence, a key requirement in any 
forensics investigation. This has the advantage that inexpert 
people can conduct file searches rather than having to learn 
complicated forensics applications. Moreover, the proposed 
scheme allows for multiple signatures for a single file of 
interest thus reducing the scheme’s susceptibility to attack and 
increased reliability. The case study and results presented in 
this paper demonstrate the applicability of the approach for live 
forensics investigations.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
related work in computer forensics and the use of file 
signatures. Section 3 posits the proposed SlackStick approach 
to identify files of interest to a computer forensics examiner. 
Section 4 presents a case study of using the approach to 
identify files of interest within test data sets. Finally, we make 
our conclusions and discuss future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
During a digital investigation it is common for forensics 
examiners to search the evidence for files of interest, i.e. those 
that are pertinent to the investigation and provide evidence of 
the activities under analysis. Most commonly, an image of the 
hard drive is taken to replicate the original evidence source. 
This ensures that the integrity of the evidence is maintained as 
all analysis is carried out on the image of the original hard 
drive. A forensics tool is used to recreate the logical structure 
of the underlying file system. A computer forensic analyst 
views the files, both extant and deleted, and files of interest are 
reported with supporting evidence, such as time of 
investigation, analyst's name, the logical and actual location of 
the file, etc. As the investigation of the hard drive relies on the 
analyst viewing files as if part of the file system, this process is 
laborious and could be prone to human error.  
Therefore, practitioners have attempted to improve the 
speed of the search within the constraints of the tools at their 
disposal. A commonly used technique is to compare MD5 
and/or SHA-1 file hashes created from the files on the hard 
drive under investigation to hashes of known files recorded 
from previous investigations using tools such as EnCase [1] 
and FTK [2]. These tools reconstruct the underlying file system 
and create hashes of files to verify the validity of the data 
analyzed by the examiner. These hashes are used to form the 
signatures for automated evidence searches. However, three 
main issues remain when using this approach. First, this 
scheme can be defeated by changing just one byte in a file as 
this will result in a new hash value. Second, this approach 
works well for files on traditional magnetic media but is 
problematic in emerging environments, such as cloud storage, 
where file fragments are located across multiple devices and 
brought together to form the file that a user sees. Finally, the 
file system has to be recreated to generate the signatures to 
enable file searches, which is a time consuming process and 
therefore precludes this technique from live forensics 
investigations. 
Due to these challenges, a number of other schemes have 
been proposed. For example, file carving is a technique that 
searches hard drives for files by comparing file headers and 
footers to a database of known parameters, such as that used by 
Scalpel [3], now a popular forensics file carving tool. Pungila 
[4] posits a file carving approach for identification of files 
through data-parallel pattern matching. Alternative schemes 
focus on file signatures, data patterns of interest embedded in a 
much larger data file and are therefore applicable to a range of 
applications, such as network security countermeasures, 
medicine, and image processing [5]. For example, [6] proposes 
a file signature scheme for intrusion detection for the 
identification of malicious PDF files. Solis [7] posits an 
approach for identifying the existence of sensitive information 
in a database utilizing individual bits.  
The advantage of signatures over hashes has led to a 
number of approaches to identify files of interest in dynamic 
environments, such as networks and cloud computing. For 
example, [8] discusses the potential of metadata tags as a 
potential approach to tracking original file information in the 
cloud. Chawathe [9] proposes the use of block-wise rather than 
file hashes for file fingerprinting whilst [10] posits a scheme to 
perform file block classification by using Support Vector 
Machines for the identification of the relative file blocks. Gan 
and Chen [11] propose a scheme for data verification based on 
the encryption of file data blocks. da Cruz Nassif and Hruschka 
[12] propose clustering as an approach to identify similarities 
between files and retrieve files of interest. Pierris and Vidali 
[13] propose an approach based on block hash values 
combined with Hierarchical Self-Organizing Map algorithms in 
order to classify broken chains of previously unknown files. 
Schaefer et al [14] and Edmundson and Schaefer [15] propose 
an approach for the retrieval of multimedia files from Huffman 
tables located in the header of JPEG files. These schemes have 
in common two issues that restrict their use in the identification 
of files in live forensics investigations. First, they require 
information used by the file system, such as header metadata 
information, which may not provide a unique, robust signature 
to form the basis of file analysis. Second, many of the schemes 
assume complete file or block data to be complete and 
unchanged, which may not be the case. If a single bit is 
changed in the original file by a malicious user, the detection 
scheme may be circumvented.  
III. THE SLACKSTICK APPROACH 
As discussed in the previous section, the common practice 
of using file-wise signatures (or hashes) as the basis for file 
identification is not without its limitations, especially for 
investigations involving live forensics. Therefore, the 
SlackStick approach posited in this paper utilizes the 
advantages of alternative schemes, in particular, the ability to 
generate multiple signatures from a single file, not requiring 
file system information to be present or recreated, and not 
relying on block-wise information. The way in which this is 
achieved is discussed below. 
The number of electronic devices that a suspect may own or 
may provide evidence of significance to a digital forensics 
investigation has grown over recent years. In addition, the 
range of technology and the available storage memory of 
electronic devices have driven the scale of such investigations. 
In the past, a forensics examiner may have only investigated a 
small number of devices, such as desktops and connected 
servers; today, an investigation will incorporate these and 
devices such as mobile phones, laptops, tablets, and Internet 
access points. This has led to the situation whereby potentially 
Terabytes of data may have to be searched for evidence 
relevant to the investigation.  
The scale of digital investigations has led to the frequent 
involvement of both first- and second-response teams during 
the forensics process. First-response teams comprise those that 
may be at the scene of an incident, such as system or network 
administrators, and therefore focus on live forensics. Second-
response teams will comprise forensics specialists that may be 
called to an incident and will work on the available data to 
collect evidence both at the scene and in specialist laboratories. 
The training afforded to first responders is often less than that 
of digital forensic specialists, prohibiting the application of 
specialist tools. Furthermore, the time required to analyze 
Terabyte-scale storage using conventional techniques is 
becoming untenable.  
As device diversity increases there is a demand for 
operating system agnostic triage tools that take into account the 
skill sets of first-response teams. This paper therefore posits an 
approach that may be used to overcome the challenges posed 
by storage scale, operating system diversity, investigation time, 
and first responder training. The principle design goals and 
system requirements for the SlackStick approach are as follows: 
• High-speed analysis of large volume data: As 
discussed above, the volume of data that may be 
searched during an investigation may involve 
Terabytes of files located on available storage media. 
Therefore, triaging of this data is required to identify 
data that may provide relevant evidence to the 
investigation. As noted in [16], triage can extract 
evidence quickly at the crime scene to provide vital 
intelligence in time critical investigations.  
• Operating system and resource agnostics: The 
diversity of devices encountered means that the 
approach must be capable of high speed analysis using 
limited computation and memory resources. In 
addition, the examiner may not have access to 
specialist forensics software, resources, or knowledge 
of the specifics of an operating system. Therefore, the 
approach must provide an automated means by which a 
variety of devices and operating systems may be 
analyzed.  
• Minimal false positives and false negatives: False 
positives are undesirable at the triage stage of digital 
investigations as they will impact on the amount of 
data that must be analyzed during the second response 
phase. This will incur resource and cost implications. 
A high rate of false negatives will ensure that evidence 
of significance will be missed during the ongoing 
investigation. 
• Minimal user interaction: As discussed above, first 
responders are often not equipped with the knowledge 
required to ensure the forensic soundness of the triage 
or the full investigation process. Limiting interaction 
with the underlying software ensures that the scope for 
human error is reduced. A simple indication that 
signatures of files of interest have or have not been 
detected will suffice for the triage process as their 
significance will be explored during the second 
response phase. 
• Partial file detection: It is often the case that deleted 
files are only partially overwritten; slack space and 
blocks marked by the file system as empty often 
contain fragments of files. It is important that these 
areas are analyzed to identify deleted or partial 
fragments of files. 
The above goals are achieved by booting a minimal Linux 
environment from flash memory, such as a USB memory drive 
attached to the device to be investigated. As will be discussed 
in the case study, a variety of Linux environments are suitable, 
such as the Slax [17] operating system (hence SlackStick). This 
environment loads a signature library into memory and 
enumerates the drives on the device. These drives are then 
mounted in read-only mode to prevent tampering with potential 
evidence that may be relied on during subsequent investigatory 
processes, a requirement of any triage activity. SlackStick reads 
the memory blocks on the target machine sequentially to 
generate block fingerprints to compare with the signature 
library. Once the search has taken place, a report is generated 
for the user to indicate whether and where signatures of files of 
interest are discovered. A benefit of this approach is that it 
provides the operating system agnostics discussed above by 
searching the underlying memory blocks with low memory and 
system resource requirements compared to forensics tools such 
as EnCase and FTK which require file system analysis. In this 
way, search times can be improved versus file-based 
approaches. Moreover, the automated approach reduces the 
level of expertise required to perform a signature search of a 
device as the user merely has to be able to insert SlackStick into 
the computer under investigation. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the SlackStick approach. 
The dashed line represents the boundary between the 
SlackStick application and the external components. As 
described below, signatures are generated from files of interest 
to form a signature library that is included in the memory stick 
mountable operating system. Each block from the evidence 
source is loaded into memory by SlackStick from which a block 
signature is generated and created to be compared with the 
signature library. If a match is found the user is informed via 
the terminal interface.  
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the SlackStick approach. 
The mountable Linux operating system is compiled from a 
Linux operating system. Slax is suitable as it provides a 
minimal operating system, approximately 200 MB in size, 
which is augmented via the addition of modules. This 
utilization of a minimal operating system reduces resource 
overheads and complexity, providing only the functionality 
required for a specific application, in this case SlackStick. 
Python is used to provide the signature search functionality and 
as such, a Python library is included on the bootable USB 
drive. As the mountable Linux operating system is booted, the 
USB drive loads the Python implementation of SlackStick, 
which is executed with root privileges. This is achieved 
through the modified rc.local script included on the SlackStick 
USB drive. Root privileges are required to gain block level 
access to the storage device undergoing triage. As discussed 
above, the storage device is accessed in read-only mode to 
avoid contamination of potential evidence that may be relied 
upon later in the forensics investigation. 
In order to provide functionality across a wide range of 
triage activities, the signature library and codebase included on 
the SlackStick USB device can be updated or modified by the 
investigator using any Windows/Mac/Linux computer. A 
Signature Creator application on such a computer creates 
signatures from known files of interest. Ideally, these files will 
be entropic, i.e. files that have a wide distribution of byte 
values, such as image or multimedia data, to provide robust 
signatures. This forms the signature library that is loaded into 
memory by the Python implementation to provide the 
comparison with the signatures generated from the blocks on 
the storage device. 
The signatures on which we search will have an impact on 
the effectiveness of the approach. If we were to search for a 
specific file, there are three factors that will affect the search. 
First, digital images may be in the region of Megabytes, 
thereby requiring a large signature. Second, only one byte in 
the original data need be altered to give rise to a large number 
of false negatives, as is the case with current practice of using 
file hashes. Third, memory blocks allocated to a file are not 
necessarily sequentially ordered on the underlying storage 
media. As the data is not sequentially stored, searches using 
large signatures may be defeated due to fragmentation of the 
file across memory locations on the storage medium. 
To create a signature for the SlackStick application, a 
known file of interest is passed to the Signature Creator where 
a block within the original file is chosen, which may be from 
anywhere within a file. With many files being upwards of 
hundreds of kilobytes in size, the file itself will use many 
blocks. The first and last blocks of a file are not provided for 
the signature search. The first block may hold generic but 
redundant data, such as setting up fonts, and therefore is less 
robust for analysis. The last block will include slack space data, 
and therefore cannot provide a reliable signature. 
SlackStick accesses the device to search for signatures of 
files of interest to the investigation. This is conducted a 
memory block at a time to ensure that the entire storage 
medium is searched. Each memory block of the storage 
medium is compared to the signature block(s). If none of these 
are found within the file, SlackStick reports that no signatures 
are matched, and therefore, no files of interest are resident on 
the device. If, however, there is a match, a report is generated 
detailing the signature matched and the physical location of the 
file in the storage media. The application continues to search 
the data until the end of the storage medium is reached. 
Figure 2 illustrates the digital signature comparison 
process. The evidence file and signatures are loaded into the 
application as illustrated in figure 1. A number of points within 
the signature block are compared to the data in the block. If all 
points are identical, a signature match is reported. 
 
Fig. 2. SlackStick signature matching. 
Once a signature block and evidence block have been 
loaded for comparison, various points of reference (i.e. 
individual bytes at pre-determined positions within the blocks) 
are compared to see if they are the same. The actual number of 
points can be chosen depending on the desired balance between 
the potential for false positives and false negatives; as the 
number of points of reference increases, so the likelihood of 
false positive decreases. However, there are also benefits to be 
had by reducing the level of precision. For example, one of the 
useful characteristics of the proposed system is that even if 
some of the evidence data is altered, it may nonetheless still be 
possible for a signature to be used to discover the existence of a 
file. Such alteration of data might occur if a malicious person 
attempts to hide the existence of some data, but without 
wishing to destroy the file completely, by altering just a few 
bytes associated with the file. Although this would have the 
effect of preventing identification using a hash-based signature 
approach, the flexibility of the SlackStick signature process 
means that it may still be able to detect the file.  
Table 1 provides an indication of how the potential for false 
positives and false negatives will change depending on the size 
of the signature (i.e. the number of points of reference) used. 
This data is based on detection in a 4 GB storage medium 
containing 500 files. The probabilities are calculated based on 
each byte having a potential value of 1/256. Therefore, using a 
single byte as a signature and assuming an even spread of byte 
values across the data set, we would expect the probability for 
819248 matches to the signature byte. This value significantly 
decreases when the probability of specific byte values in 
specific locations is calculated, as demonstrated in table 1. 
Since the partition contains 500 files, any value over 500 
indicates that false positives have been found. The table and 
figure highlight how low the probability of false positives is 
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nt illustrate that the SlackStick 
and highly accurate. As the 
ed no measurable impact on 
he assumption here is that the 
ortion of time carrying out I/O 
with the time spent on comparison with the signature library 
only taking a small proportion of the execution time. During 
the experiment zero false positives or negatives occurred. The 
performance difference (44MBps versus 78MBps) between the 
live USB (SLAX) implementation and the native 
implementation exist due to operating system optimization, the 
native implementation has more finely tuned device support 
and thus higher I/O than the Slax implementation that is 
designed to run on any machine, using generic device drivers 
with the entire OS loaded in to main memory (reducing the 
memory available for applications). 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A digital forensics investigation may involve procedures 
for both live forensics and for gathering evidence from a device 
in a forensics laboratory. Due to the focus on capturing volatile 
data during a live forensics investigation, tools have been 
developed that are aimed at capturing specific data surrounding 
state information. However, there may be circumstances 
whereby non-volatile data analysis, such as the identification of 
files of interest, is also required. In addition, this first-response 
stage of a forensics investigation may involve users with little 
or no understanding of a digital investigation or have limited 
forensics tools at their disposal. First responders require tools 
to triage devices to quickly rule them in or out of an 
investigation. If too much evidence is gathered the back log of 
cases is increased; if too little evidence is gathered the 
investigation may be put in jeopardy. 
This paper has therefore presented SlackStick, a novel 
approach for the identification of files of interest or non-
volatile evidence triage during a live forensics investigation. As 
discussed in this paper, file-wise signatures, such as hashes, are 
not without their issues. The approach posited in this paper 
uses an alternative method based on identifying features of the 
underlying file rather than performing an operation on the 
whole file or data blocks to create the search signature. The 
automated SlackStick software runs from an external device, 
such as flash memory, that is able to access persistent data 
stores in read-only mode, so as not to tamper with evidence, 
and can be used by inexpert users to perform data triage during 
live forensics investigations. The results of the case study 
demonstrate that while there is some reduction in performance 
when carrying out analysis using a live USB device when 
compared with a native deployment of SlackStick. The 
temporal requirements are reasonable and the accuracy of the 
approach is preserved. 
Further work aims to quantify the relationship between 
signature length and a variety of other factors to ensure the 
robustness of the scheme. Encryption will also be introduced to 
prevent signature tampering by malicious users. Finally, further 
analysis of the application of a variety of data structures will be 
carried out to tune the performance of the approach. 
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